Abstract
From
one point of view, the last millennia of human history is the bulk of struggles
concerning to determine which nations will survive, and which nations will go
out of existence. The important researches conducted for the last two centuries
presents that more than six thousands of languages are spoken in the world, but
the number is decreasing quickly. Therefore, it is considered as a sign of the
increasing power of strong nations to assimilate the others.
The people
arguing the nation state is one of the ways of protection from the assimilation
promote the idea that the future of a nation could be guaranteed by the
policies of the state. Although the current international system approves at
least in theory the right of self-government for each nation, sovereign state
frequently considered the separatist movements of the peoples who is located in
the area of their authority, but do not share the same sense of identity with
the sovereign community as "terror", and develop a relation with them
as a way of fight against terrorism. Among them, the national Kurdish movement
has a unique importance because it affects a wide territory and four states.
This paper
basing on the notions of ethnic terror, the Kurdish identity, national Kurdish
movements, PJAK and the foreign support, intends to examine the place of the
Kurds in the Islamic Republic of Iran, generally the Kurdish movement, and specially
PJAK currently appeared.
Keywords: Iran, Kurd, Kurdistan, PJAK, Israel
In-State
Conflict and Ethnic Terror
Because
of two controversial concepts in law and politics, it could not be met on an
agreed definition. One of these two concepts is ethnic problem and the other
one is terror. In both of them, it can be seen that target of a group becomes
dominant in group members' opinion about approaching an issue. In other words,
active side of controversy and other (passive) sides would access different
solutions.
According
to a definition, ethnic question is socio-political faction and disagreement
between groups which defining their own ''self'' and ''other'' on a base of
ethnic attributes such as common origin, language and culture. This kind of a
problem not only emerges between two different ethnic groups, but also between
state and a certain ethnic group. Origin of problem could be variable as well.
While a state wastrying to found its own bases on certain,dominant ethnic
group, an ethnic group would struggle for its autonomy or independence. In any
cases, nationalism plays an important role in this issue. Many conflictsemerge
from two different definitions of ethnic identity and citizenship.[1]
Ethnic
movements use cultural, social and political ways, even armed-forces to show
their existence. To make themselves be accepted, these ethnic groups implement
some policies against dominant group or ordinary people. Actions based on
violence, when it is evaluated from a point of view of security, concept of
''ethnic terror'' emerges. Perspective of clash-management gives a result that
can be evaluated as ''in-state skirmish''.[2]
Although there is not an accepted certain definition of terror, it can be
defined generally as ''Planned and systematic actions based on violence against
society to create fear and anxiety among people for a political goal.''[3]Ethnic
terror is defined as the actions of the groups that has emerged from the ethnic
groups who have a feeling of exclusion based on their ethnicity, and defined as
the actions aimed to pressure the party in power via terrifying the society
through violence in order to control the future of the people that they
consider themselves as the agents of the people or to have the right in the
distribution of the power.[4]This
definition is similar with definition of ''clash''that is defined as ''to wound
or abate possessors for gaining or claiming right on their values, status,
power or sources''.[5]
According to them, armed struggle takes shorter time than peaceful ways to
access their goals.[6]
Also, central government's weakness in solving problem becomes a propaganda
tool in the hands of them.[7]Terrorists
perceive themselves as unwilling warriors against oppressive state, plunderer
ethnic or nationalist groupsand insensitive international society.[8] These
kinds of groups are generally founded by an educated elite[9] and
they try to expand their fields of activity[10] and
also claim that they are fighting for getting the right of self-determination
and try to find support at international level through their propaganda units'
contact[11] with
political parties, intellectuals, academic institutions and organizations.[12] They
have mechanisms for both military and political activities and they believe
that political achievement comes after military achievement. Martin McGuinnes
-can be seen as brain of Sinn Fein- was saying ''Sinn Fein will sit at the
table with guns'' and this quote become sign of this belief.[13]
Although they have administration mechanisms, in the organizations of countries
of the Third World, leaders' decisions cannot be indisputable.[14]
International
actors come into scene in three different ways. Firstly, encouraging fight and
expanding it, secondly, reconciliation and thirdly, oppression/isolation. In
other words, impartiality, being intercessor and taking side of government or
separatist organization are the roles of international actors. Foreign powers
supporting separatist organizations, not to be in an illegal position in terms
of law, they would do this through indirect ways. These assistance could be
physical like money, gun, education, transportation, logistics and intelligence
or be diplomatic-political support like supporting political campaigns or
giving official declarations.[15]
Evolution of Kurdish Identity throughout
History
The
name Kurdistan emerged in the 12th century, after establishing of Seljukid
Empire. The field that Seljuqs called ''Kurdistan'' was in Iran. This province
was founded by Sultan Sancar and centre of it was Bahar Castle in the northwest
of Hemedan and this province was covering Hemedan, Dirvan and Kirmanşah in the
east of Zagros Mountains, Şehr-i Zur and Sancar in the west of it.[16]Then this
name, Kurdistan has spread and began to cover all fields that Kurds live.[17]
Seljuqs andKurds' themselves were calling themselves as ''Kurd'' although they
had separations based on religion, language and tribes. This was also separating
Kurds from Turks, Arabs and Iranians.[18]
Linguists
argue that ''Kurd'' means ''warrior'' in Kurdish language.[19] It
looks like rebellionusness is a value in their culture.[20]According
to another opinion, Kurdish identity was shaped by rebellions against powerful
people assimilating or abating Kurdish existence and Kurds overcame this
situation. According to Kurds, history is a place that fighting against enemy
peoples, so it is known that Kurds say ''Our only friend is mountains''[21]
This
perception of Kurds led to this, Mesudi and Taberiwrote that Kurds mainly
living around Zagros Mountains.[22]There
are different claims about origins of this people calling themselves Kurd.
These claims are Arabic origin, Turkish, Iranian and Armenian.[23]Some
Kurdish writers claim that Kurdish history traced back to 2000 BCE, to
Indo-European people around Zagros Mountains.[24]Despite
of some writers claiming a history approximately 7-8000 years, Kurdish history
is begun with Med Empire established in 8000 BCE in Persia.However, this view
was also evaluated as a myth and many historians did not consider it. In a
close past, a group of ''Israelite'' researcher wrote that Kurds are
genetically relatives of Jews.[25]In
any case, Venetian traveller Marco Polo's memories characterizing them as
bandits[26],
expressions of people visiting the field in the 16th century, official records
and linguistic culture show that they were identified themselves as Kurds.[27]
This
people called ''Kurd'' is living in a field approximately 500 thousand square kilometre,
that is from middle of Turkey to south Caucasus and then via Iran-Iraq border
to southern parts of the zone. Herewith, Kurds live not alone in this zone with
water and patrol sources.[28]Turks,
Arabs, Iranians, Armenians, Assyrians and the others live here also and this
situation makes this area far away from homogeneity.[29]
There
is not certain information about population of the Kurds living in that zone
because censuses are not base on ethnicity.[30]As
average numbers, 25 million[31] and
30 million[32]
claims of different groups about population of the Kurds. 10 million and 35
million are extremities about this people's population.[33]It is
thought that almost 10-12 million of these people live in Turkey. 5-6 million
people live in Iran and 1 million live in Syria. Also, it is known that 80
thousand Kurds live in Azerbaijan and Armenia.[34]
Proportions of the Kurds in these countries to total population is that %43 is
in Turkey, %31 is in Iran, %18 is in Iraq, %6 is in Syria and %2 is in other
countries.[35]
It should be said that after these studies, in time, Kurdish population
continued to rise and proportions have changed a little bit.
Some
scholars studied on the topic whether Kurds are a nation or not and they
studied their language, cuisine, clothes, literature, myths, religion and
culture in this context[36]. So
it can be said according to these studies that Kurdish language is in
Indo-European language family, similar with Persian language but have not
similarity with Turkish and Arabic, Kurdish literature is generally base on
oral culture[37],
Kurds are dominantly Sunni Muslim, Shia comes after[38] and
a small group of Kurd is Jew.[39]
Kurdish National Movement in Iran
Today, Kurdish national identity is accepted but
Kurdistan is using officially just in Iran[40] and
Iraq as a term.[41]Herewith,
Kurdish national movement went through many phase. ShaikhUbeydullah, an Ottoman
subject, passed Iranian border and controlled Mehabad and Urumiye for a short
time[42] in
1880. This movement is accepted as the first example of Kurdish national
movement.[43]Second
Kurdish uprising in Iran emerged in the chaotic atmosphere of the World War I.
In 1920, Ismail Agha Simku[44], a
dissident to centralization policies of Iran, organized an uprising but Rıza
Han Pehlevi (later Shah Rıza) oppressed this uprising.[45]Simkuwas
assassinated and people in uprising places were disarmed.[46]
There was not an intellectual and national base in this uprising but it became
an inspiration to rebellions coming after itself.[47]
After
World War I, in VersaillesPeace Conference, an intention showed to Kurds to
establish a nation state and this intention transformed into a promise in
Sevres.[48]
However, England and Russia wanted to improve their relationship with Turkey
and the Kurds, in this situation, felt be betrayed[49]
because they were waiting for an independent state but they separated into
smaller parts.[50]
Then,
English foreign policy used Kurds as a threat against Turkish, Iranians and
Arabs.[51]
Borders designated with a treaty between England-Turkey-Iraq dated 5th July
1926, probably was showing the field between Kurdish state and Turkey.[52] With
this treaty, England became protector of Kurds and Shaikh Mahmud Hafid was
appointed as local administrator, Hafid then declared himself as Kurdish king.[53]Although
the first target could not be accessed, Sevres Peace Treaty and intention to
establish an independent state perceived as a headstone.[54]
Because
of all these reasons, Kurdish society and movement in Iran cannot be considered
as a separated movement than activities of Iraqi Kurds and Kurdish society.
These two always affected each other. After these, a party in Turkey raised its
activities during Iran-Iraq War, it was ''PartiyeKarkaren Kurdistan''
(Kurdistan Workers' Party) under Abdullah Öcalan.[55]
Between
two world wars, Kurdish movement was weaker than others. Robert Olson compares
Iran and Turkey in terms of Kurdish movements and says that Iran is not secular
as much as Turkey and Iranian government is more tolerated about minorities.[56]
However, as Michael Gunter quoted from KerimYıldız, Iranian culture is very
close to Kurdish culture and Kurds don't feel themselves as foreign there so
this situation has an impact on weakness of Kurdish movement in Iran.[57]
During this period, none of the foreign powers supported actually Kurdish
movement except France, they thought that supporting central governments is
more proper for their interests. According to USSR, this policy was the best
way against threats coming from England.[58]
World
War II and after Cold War years are the period of alliances and separations for
Kurdish national movement. After RızaPehlevi dethroned in 1941, Kurds founded
many political parties.In 1942, for example, founding with inspiration of KOMALA[59]
(Resurrection Organization of Kurdistan),PartiDemokratiKurdistani Iran
(Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan) was one of them.[60] To
balance USA's existence in the Gulf, USSR changed its old policy[61] and
supported Gazi Muhammad, leader of DPIK, under supervision of USSR consul in
Urumiye[62] in
22th January 1946, promulgated Republic of Mehabat that live only one year.[63]In
Iranian borders, a state considering autonomy lived only one years but became a
symbol for Kurdish nationalist movement.[64]Republic
of Mehabat, in a short time, changed school curriculums, began to education in
Kurdish and translated lecture books into Kurdish, published daily newspapers
and monthly journals, security services was taken from Shah and given to
peshmerga and while doing this, Republic benefited from Barzani, he sent 20.000
peshmerga as assistance.[65]With
its situation, Republic of Mehabat has spread fear also in Turkey and Iraq.[66]Then,
Rıza Shah's army took control and prohibited Kurdish, so Kurdish movement in
Iran obviously disappeared.[67]DPIK
went underground and this party cooperated with Tudeh Party[68]during
1950s. Then, DPIK moved its centre to Iraq.[69]Democratic
Party of Iraq Kurdistan is also a product of these years.[70]
There
was an important effect of USSR in the process going to Republic of Mehabad but
another factor was also considered as effective about USSR's policy. In 1945's
April, Kurdish nationalist movement organized a ''Union of Kurds'' conference
in San Francisco and then opened propaganda centres in Iraq, Iran and Syria.[71]
Turkey, as a NATO member, got prerogative of oppressing Kurdish activities[72] as
considered them terrorist movements[73]
rather than recognizing Kurdish identity.
After
1966, Democratic Party of Iran Kurdistan elites turning back to Iran, unified
with Tudeh Party under the slogan ''Democracy for Iran, autonomy for
Kurdistan'' and fought together against Shah up to 1968. In 1969, Iranian Kurds
founded an organization composed of city dwellers and intellectuals. Actually
this organization was not new, just reunion of an old one. KOMALA (Society of
Revolutionist Toilers of Iran Kurdistan), ideologically Marxist and defending a
democratic Iran with autonomous Kurdistan[74], was
moving on its activities as a part of Iranian Communist Party[75].Townies
and intellectuals were depicting traditional Kurdish elites and leaders in
Kurdish social order as people do not believe in strong and national Kurdish
movement.[76]
Conflict
between Shah and Kurds was continuing but during the process going to 1979
Islamic Revolution, Kurds generally supported Imam Khomeini.[77]
Leader cadre of the revolution allowed DPIK leader to turn back from exiles
that began in the reign of Shah.[78]However,
after Khomeini's return to Iran, DPIK repeated its autonomy demand and declared
a program with eight articles. In these, there were autonomy for Kurdish field,
Kurdish parliament, recognizing Kurdish language officially, supplying more
economic sources for this field, Kurdish representation in the central
government, freedom of press and organization.[79]Then
foundation of local Kurdish security forces and appointment of local leaders
were added to these articles.[80]After
they were rejected, DKIP defined themselves as a revolutionist Kurdish
organization rather than an Iranian party.[81]According
to liberal prime minister Beni Sadr, they were counter-revolutionist and in
Iranian press they were shown as Marxist and Zionist, these Kurdish groups
began to attack Iranian army three weeks after coming of Khomeini.[82]Actually,
a dominant proportion of Iranian Kurds in a positive attitude about new regime
but DPIK and other Marxist Kurdish groups were thinking that Kurds should never
reconcile with this regime, so, they have boycottedreferendum organizing in 1st
April 1979 for determining regime's shape.[83]
Conflicts began in February, 1979 and in these conflicts, Shia Kurds fought
together with Khomeini's forces against Marxist and nationalist Kurds. After
1980, Marxist and nationalist Kurds of Iran, began to attack again with support
of Turkish and Iraqi Kurds.[84]Moreover,
support did not come only from Iraqi and TurkishKurds, organizations like
People's Mujahedin of Iran -a leftist organization fighting against Baath
regime and also Islamic regime- were supporting Kurdish movement as well and
playing a role in resuming war.[85]Opinion
of central government became clearer after joining of DKIP to National
Resistance Council of People's Mujahedin of Iran in 1982 in Paris.[86]After
3 years, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps took control of Kurdish region and
armed Kurdish elements deported, in 1984, loss of Kurds raised to 20.000
militant[87]
and this led to decrease of volume of fights.[88]Decisive
victory of the army came in 1988.[89]Abdurrahman
Kasımlo, leader of DPIK who supports Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War[90] and
being seen as the most impressive Kurdish leader in the 20th century after
Mustafa Barzani, was assassinated in Vienna, 1989.[91]His
successor's fate was the same with him, in Berlin in 1992 he was also
assassinated.[92]Kurdish
nationalist movement blamed Iranian central government for both assassination.
As a
result of positive cases during presidency of Mohamed Khatami, nationalist
Kurdish movement directed itself to socio-cultural policies. Kurds began to
exercise rights coming from Iranian constitution.[93] In
this case, many journals were published in Iranian universities in Kurdish
language. Cultural activities were performed in every Kurdish city. Kurdish
deputies presented themselves as a different group. Number of Kurdish students
in Iran universities raised and these students joined political and cultural
debates actively. Kurdish channels in TV also began to be watched and their
effects increased depended on these increasing rating. Kurdish movement took
care of separating itself from predecessors.[94]However,
as we will explain below, this positive atmosphere also could not prevent
emergence of new armed groups.
During
the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was arming Iraqi Kurds against Baath regime and Iran
also played a role in increasing Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey.[95]PKK
began its actions in 1984[96] and
with their approaches spreading violence, they were compared with SenderoLuminoso of Peru and their leader Abdullah Öcalan was similar
to Stalin because of his uncontroversial extolled personality[97],
although Öcalan was seeing himself as Jesus.PKK's main armed groups are in
Qandil Mountains and after 1991, they fought sometimes with some local
political Kurdish parties in Iraq. PKK was ideologically Marxist at the
beginning but then exercised a transformation toward democratic liberalism.
Civil activists should be protected by militants, according to them.[98]
After
ending of Saddam Hussein's Baath regime, together with local Kurdish parties, a
group allied to PKK came to scene on Qandil Mountains. PKK inspired this group
about autonomous order in Iraq and their power in Turkey, then this new group
named itself as Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and announced existence in
2004.[99]Group
leader is RahmanHacıAhmedi who has been living in Germany more than 20 years
and PJAK shares same ideological base and action methods with PKK, also there
are Turkish citizens[100] are
in leadership council of the group.[101]PJAK
announced its target as changing Guardianship of Islamic Jurist to federal and
democratic system with human rights, equality of gender and freedom of speech,
even, not only for Kurds but also forAzerbaijanis, Balochis and Arabs.[102]
In
2008, in an interview with Chris Kutschera, RahmanHacıAhmedi said that they are
different from other Kurdish parties, they are founded by Iranian and European
young people after a long preparation period, fighting for a confederal and
democratic Iran, try to create a common platform by raising awareness of people,
will protect people with their guns if necessary but don't believe that current
situation couldn't be changed just with guns. Ahmedi also said that they have a
free area in Qandil but they don't want to liberated zones in the cities, they
are allied with groups against regime, moreover, they are siblings of PKK that
fighting in different areas for different aims: ''PKK's aim is recognizing of
Kurds officially in Turkish constitution but PJAK wants to a free Kurdistan in
a confederal Iran regime.'' Also he adds, they have a parliament administrating
them and it iscomposed of 21 members with 8 woman among them, they are
separating into three parts in Iran, another thing he said is that people
without being paid and civic life (family life), living in mountains,
professional warriors are called as guerrilla, not peshmerga and %35 of this
guerrilla group is woman, they don't have a relationship with Democratic Party
of Kurdistan in Iraqi Kurdistan andPatriotic Union of Kurdistan but he talks to
Iranian dissidents in USA and they don't have a relationship with USA
government, lastly, they are leaning towards Iranian dissidents.[103]
When
they are compared, PJAK looks like a weaker threat than PKK but PJAK's actions
against Iranian forces are not lesser than PKK.[104]According
to Iranian government, 120 soldiers were killed by PJAK just in 2005. More than
120 soldiers were killed in 2006. James Brandon says that PJAK attacks on
military forces, even, although government of Iran calls them as a ''terrorist
group'' but Iran doesnot blame PJAK as a group attacking civilians.[105] It
is being thought that the organization has approximately 3000 guerrillas.[106]
They use in actions the tactic hit-and-run,they mix ordinary people or withdraw
to their base in Iraq.[107]Chairman
of woman's branch of PJAK, Gülistan Dugan says that %45 of members of PJAK is
woman and women take responsibility in military operations.[108]
Government of Iran give answer through bombing PJAK bases and also these
bombardments was including PKK bases in Qandil Mountains.[109]
Also Iran copied village guard system from Turkey successfully.[110]
According
to The Middle East Reporter records and some writers, some Islamic Revolution
Guard Corps high-ranked officers were killed in conflicts between Iranian
government and PJAK.[111] As
a response to these, Iranian government attacked directly to PJAK bases and
killed many commanders of the group[112].
Also so many guerrillas of PJAK were killed in these operations.[113]
High-ranked commanders of Iran say that operations, especially against PJAK
will continue until dissidents becoming ineffective or ending totally. PJAK
mouthpieces accepted that their bases are bombarded by Iran.[114]After
the intensification of conflicts in Irak and operations of Iranian Army
expanding to a few square kilometers zone[115], Iraqi
Kurdistan President MesudBarzani summoned for a diplomatic solution to PJAK and
Kurdish groups.[116]Conflicts
between Iran and PJAK reach a peak in 2011 and after 3 days, according to news
sources close to the organization[117]
PJAK ex parte[118]
declared cease fire and then withdrew to Qandil Mountains from Casusan camp in
Iran-Iraq border and soldiers of Iran settled there.[119]
While
conflicts were continuing between Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and PJAK, a
new originated in Iran has spread in Turkey and this new was that second man of
PKK was captured by Iranian forces. According to chairman of Iran Parliament
Commission of National Security AlaaddinBrucerdi, he doesn't give a name but he
says in this new that together with some members of terrorist organization,
second man of them was also captured. Of course, this man is Murat Karayılan
but PKK refuted this new. However, a short time after Karayılan came into scene
and gave an interview to ANF News Agency. He said that they don't want to fight
against Iran, if Iran doesn’t commit violence, PJAK also should not do and this
armistice would be eternal and this issue would solve peacefully.[120]In
another interview dated March 2013, Karayılan said ''Today, Iran is also loyal
to armistice ceased by PJAK and there is no fighting''[121]Actually
after 2011, no fight that would lead to violating the armistice was exercised.
Effect of Foreign Powers on Nationalist
Kurdish Movement and Attitude of Iran
According to some writers, Kurdish groups assisted
foreign powers for weakening central governments. While England was using Kurds
against Turkey during 1920s, USA and Israel used against Baghdad and Teheran.[122]
Kurds
had always a place in Zionist theorists and thinkers' Middle East plans.[123]
Some Kurds in Iraq were Jews and Alliance Israelite Universelle opened schools
in the early 20th century in Iraq, thus, Iraqi Kurds met Zionism before
establishing of Israel.[124]In
these years, a spy from Zionist secret service, Rubin Shila, managed to
establish a intelligence network.[125]In
the late 1930s, Kurds gained much more importance with ''Periphery Theory'' of
David Ben Gurion (later first prime minister of Zionist Israel). According to
this theory, Israel was a state surrounded by Arab states and it needed
non-Arab alliances, also non-Arab minorities in Arab states should be supported
to weaken Arab states. Because of being an oil rich and its promising situation[126],
theory began to be implemented with Iraq.[127]In
the late 1950s and early 1960s, Zionist Israel regime became main procurer of
Iraqi Kurds an also thousands of MOSSAD agents were sent to the field as
agriculturalist, military advisor, doctor and human right activists, even it is
said that some agents were gathered from Amnesty International and other
charity organizations.[128]Before
1979, Zionist Israel's improving relationship with two great non-Arab states of
the field, Iran and Turkey is an indicator of this ideology as well. It is
thought that Zionist Israel regime, Turkey and Iran organized operations
together with local Kurds, to weaken Iraq.[129]Strategy
of being dominant in Persian Gulf pushed Shah Rıza to be an alliance of Israel
and Iran became a transition point for American and Israel guns that are sent
to Iraqi Kurds.[130]Congress
members Otis Pike said that Kissinger, Nixon and Shah never have an intention
to make Kurds victorious but weaken alliance Israel's enemy neighbourhood.[131]
After
1979, Iran cut its assistance to Iraqi Kurds and Israel had to review its
Periphery Theory. About this, a former diplomat OdedYinon was writing in his
article ''A Theory for Israel in Nineteen
Hundred Eighties'' media organ of World Zionist Organization, Kivunim in February 1982 that Israel had
no choice except encouraging minorities.[132]After
changing of Iran's side, Israel began to organize operations in Iran by using
Kurdsas well. In documents captured in former USA Embassy building, it is
understood that secret operations were organized from Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey
to Iran's inside and MOSSAD was generally a part of these operations.[133]Iran
thinks that USA, Zionist Israel and England secret services finance and direct
PJAK.[134]While
there are some signs about joining of former Zionist soldiers to operations
against Iran, PJAK leader Ahmed says that they are ready
to build relationship with everybody who want to assist Kurds.[135]One
of the founders of the party, Osman Öcalan (brother of PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan) says in an interview given Los
AngelesTimes that PJAK has a good relationship with USA and they are
offered for military, economical and medical aid by USA.[136]Also,
Seymour Hersh told in New Yorker that Zionist Israel regime trained Kurds in
Iran and Turkey and gave equipments and also 1200 MOSSAD agents are still in
the field. However, this claim was severely refuted by Israel's diplomatic
mission in Washington.[137]Operations
against Iran in two ways: in Iran's itself and Iraq-based. A claim says that
these operations are to prevent Iran from filling the gap emerging after
withdrew of USA from Iraq.[138]
Today,
although current Islamic regime is cooperating with Turkey in security issues[139],
different from Turkey, Islamic regime does not feel itself indigent to USA and
Western powers and does not request their allowance for military and
intelligence activities. While Turkey organizing operations to Iraqi Kurdistan
against PKK with Washington's air attach permission and intelligence sharing[140], Iran
is organizing these kinds of operations with its own capability and facilities[141],
although PJAK is blaming USA because of intelligence sharing with Turkey led to
indirectly providing intelligence Iran.[142]
This situation provides Islamic Republic a free movement zone and this
capability prevents Iraqi Kurdistan from an alliance against Iran.[143]
Islamic
Republic of Iran, not only accomplished pacification of armed Kurdish movement
via its internal and external policies, but also assisted Kurdish forces
against currents which are enemies of all Middle East.
Conclusion
Although different theorists from sovereign countries
of the fieldare claiming several remarks and except Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurds
cannot possess which is politically recognized, there is no doubt that a folk
exists and its members are identifying themselves as Kurd. They are authentic
people of the field and with their population concentrated in Turkey, Iran,
Iraq and Syria, they are living together with Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Persians
and Azerbaijanis for more than one thousand years. However, nation-state
structures are feeding ethnic based separation, violence and even terrorism.
This situation gives a chance to powers that want to weaken ethnic identities,
local people and their states for an intervention.
In
Iran, there isn't any article prohibiting Kurds' exercising either religious or
national rights. However, a group of Kurds' relationship with field-out states
and Zionist Israel regime affects Iranian state about keeping itself apart from
Kurdish nationalist movement and even driving government to be watchfulness. While
unwelcoming attitudes of USA and Zionist Israel against Iran does not show a
sign for promising a positive change, a movement close to them would probably cannot
gain a legitimized area and will be labelled as a ''terrorist action''. Also,
Iranian elite says that they are ready to overcome Kurdish problem by pluralist
participation models. Continuation of accomplishment against PJAK is attached
to operability of these pluralist participation models.
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Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism, Middle
Eastern Studies,Vol. 41, No. 1, 153–168, January 2005
Geoffrey F.
Gresh,
Iranian Kurds in an Age of Globalisation, Iran and the Caucasus 13 (2009) 187-196
GhadaHashemTalhami,
Diplomacy of the Kurdish territorial nation, International Journal of
Contemporary Iraqi Studies Volume 7 Number 1
Graham E. Fuller, The
Fate Of The Kurds, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993
HashemAhmadzadeh
and Gareth Stansfield, The Political, Cultural, and Military
Re-Awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran, Middle East Journal
Magazine Volume 64, No. 1, winter 2010
HinerSaleem, From My Father's Rifle A Childhood in Kurdistan)
Excerpted from My Father's Rifle: A
Childhood in Kurdistan by HinerSaleem, translated from the French by Catherine Temerson, to be published by
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, LLC in January 2005.
James Brandon,
Iran's Kurdish Threat: PJAK, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 4 Issue: 12
John R. Bradley,
Iran’s Ethnic Tinderbox, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006-07
Kirstin J. H.
Brathwaite,
Repression and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict in Kurdistan, Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, 37:6, 473-491, 2014
Michael E.
Bonine,
The Kurds and Kurdistan: A Commentary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2002,
43, No. 4, pp. 300-304.
Michael M.
Gunter,
Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.
23, No. 1, April 2003
Michael M.
Gunter,
The Kurdish Question in Perspektive, World Affairs, Vol.166 No:4, Spring 2004
Michael Rubin, Are
Kurds a Pariah Minority?, SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Spring 2003)
Natali, Denise. The
Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq,Turkey, and Iran, Journal of Third World Studies, Sprıng 2010
Robert Olson, The
Kurdish question in the aftermath of the Gulf War: geopolitical and
geostrategic changes in the Middle East, Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992
Sabri ATEŞ, In
the Name of the Caliph and the Nation: The Sheikh Ubeidullah Rebellion of
1880–81, Iranian Studies, 2014 Vol. 47, No. 5, 735–798
SargisMamikonian,
Israel and The Kurds (1949-1990), Iran and the Caucasus, 9.2
Shane Donovan,
Kurdistan The Elusive Quest for Sovereignty, Harvard International Review Fall
2006
The Kurds in Iran: The Past, Present and Future, by
KerimYildiz and Tanyel
B. Taysi.
Reviewed by Michael M. Gunter
The Middle East Reporter Monday, June 7, 2010
The Middle East Reporter Thursday July 21, 2011
The Middle East Reporter Monday, September 05, 2011
The Middle East Reporter Thursday Sept. 8, 2011
The Middle East Reporter Friday, September 30, 2011
Thomas Renard,
PJAK in Northern Iraq: Tangled Interests and Proxy Wars, Terrorism Monitor
Volume: 6 Issue: 10
TozunBahçeli,
Peter Fragiskatos, Iraqi Kurdistan: Fending off uneasy neighbours,
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies Volume 2 Number 1
Vanessa G. Acker, Religion Among The Kurds: Internal Tolerance,
External Conflict, , Kennedy School Review
Wladimir van
Wilgenburg,
Breaking from Baghdad Kurdish Autonomy vs. Maliki’s Manipulation, World
Affairs, November/December 2012
William Linn
Westermann,
Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion, fuly 1946 issue of Foreign Affairs
ZiyaMeral and
Jonathan Paris, Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity, The
Washington Quarterly, October 2010
[1]ErolKurubaş,
EtnikSorun-DışPolitikaİlişkisiBağlamındaKürtSorunununTürkDışPolitikasınaEtkileri,
Ankara
Journal of EuropeanStudies, I: 8, N:1, p:42
[2]Efegil, Devlet-içi Çatışmalar ve
Çatışma Yönetimi (Ders Notları), Sakarya, 2014, p:8
[3]Efegil, p:53
[4]EminGürses, Uluslararası Sistemin
Kıskacında Etnik Terör, Profil Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2007, p:13
[5]Efegil, p:15
[6]Gürses, p:16
[7]Gürses, p:17
[8]Efegil, p:53
[9]Gürses, p:18
[10]Gürses, p:19
[11]Gürses, p:20
[12]Gürses, p:15
[13]Gürses, p:21
[14]Gürses, p:19
[15]Kurubaş, p:45
[16]Ahmet
BURAN, KürtlerVeKürtDili, Turkish
Studies - International Periodical For The Languages,
Literature
and History of TurkishorTurkic Volume 6/3 Summer 2011, p:47
[17]GhadaHashemTalhami,
Diplomacy of the Kurdish territorial nation, International Journal of
Contemporary
IraqiStudies,
Volume 7,Number 1, p:22
[18]Craig
Douglas Albert, A History of Violence: Ethnie Group Identity and the Iraqi
Kurds, Iran and the
Caucasus
17 {2013), p:223
[19]Albert, p:224
[20]Albert, p:223
[21]Carl Dahlman,
ThePoliticalGeography of Kurdistan, EurasianGeography and Economics, 43:4, p:273
[22]BURAN, p:47
[23]BURAN, p:50
[24]Albert, p:224
[25]SargisMamikonian, Israel And
TheKurds (1949-1990), Iran and theCaucasus, 9.2, p:381
[26]Dahlman, p:271
[27]Albert, p:224
[28]Michael M. Gunter,
TheKurdishQuestion in Perspektive, World Affairs, Vol.166 No:4, Spring 2004, p:198
[29]Michael Rubin, AreKurds a
PariahMinority?,SocialResearch, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Spring 2003), p:295
[30]Madih, p:12
[31]Alexander
Benard and J. P. Schnapper-Casteras, Northern Exposure Kurdistan After the
Withdrawal, World
Affairs July / August
2010, p:83; Robert Olson, The Kurdish question in the aftermath of the
Gulf War:
geopolitical and geostrategic changes in the Middle
East, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992, p:475;
Michael E. Bonine, The Kurds and Kurdistan: A
Commentary, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2002, 43,
No.
4, p:300; Rubin, p:295; Graham E. Fuller, TheFate Of TheKurds,ForeignAffairs,
Spring 1993, p:109
[32]Natali
Denise. The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq,Turkey, and
Iran, Journal of Third
World Studies, Spring 2010, p:312
[33]BURAN, p:48
[34]Olson, p:475
[35]Gunter, p:197
[36]Albert, p:226
[37]Albert,p:229
[38]Dahlman, p:275
[39]Mamikonian, p:385
[40]John R. Bradley,
Iran’sEthnicTinderbox, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006-07, p:181
[41]Rubin, p:296
[42]Rubin, p:299
[43]SabriAteş,
In the Name of the Caliph and the Nation: The Sheikh Ubeidullah Rebellion of
1880–81, Iranian
Studies,
2014 Vol. 47, No. 5, p:736
[44]HashemAhmadzadeh
and Gareth Stansfield, The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of
the
KurdishNationalistMovement
in Iran, Middle East Journal Magazine Volume 64, No. 1, winter 2010, p:13
[45]Rubin, p:318-319
[46]Dahlman, p:283
[47]Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:13
[48]Fuller, p:109
[49]Albert, p:229
[50]Olson, p:475
[51]Olson, p:480
[52]Olson, p:481
[53]Talhami, p:24
[54]Dahlman, p:285
[55]Olson, p:489
[56]Olson, p:486
[57]The
Kurds in Iran: The Past, Present and Future, by KerimYildiz and TanyelB. Taysi.
Reviewed by Michael
M.
Gunter, p:540
[58]Olson, p:483
[59]Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:14
[60]Geoffrey F. Gresh, IranianKurds
in an Age of Globalisation, Iran and theCaucasus 13 (2009,) p:189
[61]Olson, p:484
[62]Gresh, p:189
[63]Gresh, p:189
[64]Gresh, p:189
[65]Gresh, s:190
[66]Kirstin
J. H. Brathwaite, Repression and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict in Kurdistan,
Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism,
37:6, 473-491, 2014, p:479
[67]ShaneDonovan,
KurdistanTheElusiveQuestforSovereignty, Harvard International Review Fall 2006,
p:8
[68]Ahmadzadeh; Stansfield, p:15
[69]Gresh, p:190
[70]Brathwaite, p:479
[71]William
Linn Westermann, Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion, fuly 1946 issue of
Foreign
Affairs,
p:50
[72]Bonine, p:302
[73]Olson, p:488
[74]Talhami,p:37
[75]Gresh, p:190
[76]Gresh, p:188
[77]Gresh, p:190
[78]Ahmadzadeh; Stansfield, p:17
[79]Brathwaite, p:482
[80]Ahmadzadeh; Stansfield, p:19
[81]Gresh, p:190
[82]Rubin, p:319
[83]Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:18
[84]Gresh, p:190
[85]Dahlman, p:285
[86]Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:20
[87]Olson, p:478
[88]Rubin, p:319
[89]Brathwaite, p:482
[90]Talhami, p:37
[91]Carol
Prunhuber, The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd: Dreaming Kurdistan, Book
Reviews, Iran and
theCaucasus
14 (2010),p:461
[92]Talhami, p:37
[93]In
the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, other religions with the 12th
article, freedom of speech and press
with the 15th article, equality of all ethnic groups with the 19th article are
taken under guarantee.
[94]Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:21
[95]Olson, p:489
[96]Rubin, p:313
[97]Rubin, p:314
[98]James Brandon,
Iran'sKurdishThreat: PJAK, TerrorismMonitor Volume: 4 Issue: 12, p:2
[99]Brandon, p:2
[100]Brandon, p:2
[101]EdBlanche, KurdishPowderKeg,
TheMiddle East, January 2008
[102]Brandon, p:2
[103]ChrisKutscheraTheMiddle East
August/5eptember 2008, p:21
[104]TozunBahçeli,
Peter Fragiskatos, Iraqi Kurdistan: Fending off uneasy neighbours,
International Journal of
ContemporaryIraqiStudies
Volume 2 Number 1, p:77
[105]Brandon, s:2
[106]Brandon, p:1
[107]Brandon, p:3
[108]Brandon, p:2
[109]Brandon, p:3
[110]Brandon, p:4
[111]Ed
Blanche, Kurdish Powder Keg, The Middle East,
January 2008, p:27
(Although
Iran's side claims that helicopter while Islamic Revolution Guard Corps Sector
CommanderSeyyidKahhari was also in it, fell down because of technical problems,
PJAK argues that helicopter was felt down by their fire.)
[112]TheMiddle East
ReporterThursdaySept. 8, 2011
[113]TheMiddle East ReporterFriday,
September 30, 2011
[114]TheMiddle East
ReporterThursdayJuly 21, 2011
[115]TheMiddle East ReporterMonday,
June 7, 2010
[116]TheMiddle East
ReporterThursdaySept. 8, 2011
[117]http://avasinweb.com/nucenaverok.php?HaberID=3336
[118]TheMiddle East ReporterMonday,
September 05, 2011
[119]http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-pjak-iran-dan-cekiliyor-78376/
[120]http://www.lekolin.net/haber-2103-Karayilan-Idamlar-Durursa-PJAK-Siyasal-Alana-Cekilebilir.html ;
http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=64319
[121]http://firatajans.com/news/kurdistan/karayilan-karar-almamiz-kolay-degil.htm
[122]Fuller, p:108
[123]Mamikonian, p:391
[124]Talhami, p:27
[125]Talhami, p:27
[126]Mamikonian, p:397
[127]Talhami, p:28
[128]Mamikonian, p:397
[129]Olson,p:484
[130]Talhami, p:27
[131]Talhami, p:29
[132]Talhami, p:28
[133]Mamikonian, p:396
[134]Blanche, p:28
[135]Ahmadzadeh;Stansfield, p:25
[136]Thomas
Renard, PJAK in Northern Iraq: Tangled Interests and Proxy Wars, Terrorism
Monitor Volume: 6
Issue: 10, Yazıyaaşağıdaki web
adresindenulaşılabilir:
(http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4924&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%55D=167&no_cache=1#.VIl9bNKsVVU)
[137]Blanche, p:28
[138]Blanche, p:28
[139]ZiyaMeral
and Jonathan Paris, Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity, The
Washington Quarterly,
October
2010, p:81
[140]Bahçeli;Fragiskatos,
p:79
[141]Bahçeli;Fragiskatos, p:76
[142]Renard,
writing is available in the link below:
(http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4924&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1#.VIl9bNKsVVU)
[143]Bahçeli;Fragiskatos, p:77
.JPG)
